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NOTE
DRUG ABUSE, LAW ABUSE, AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT: NEW YORK'S 1973 DRUG
LEGISLATION AND THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
I
INTRODUCTION

On January 3, 1973, in his fifteenth annual State of the State
Message, New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller remarked:
"[T]he number one, growing concern of the American people is
crime and drugs-coupled with an all-pervasive fear for the safety
of their person and their property."' Rockefeller detailed the rising
sense of frustration which led him to conclude that only two
courses of action were available: "Either we can go on as we have
been, with little real hope of changing the present trend; [o]r we
must take those stern measures that, I have become convinced,
common sense demands."'
The thrust of the Rockefeller proposals, which emphasized
deterrence and isolation of the drug offender, 3 was largely directed at divesting the judiciary of discretion in the disposition of
indictments and the imposition of sentences. 4 Mandatory life imprisonment was proposed for all dealers in dangerous drugs, 5 and

neither plea bargaining nor possibility of parole, nor youthful
offender treatment would be available for certain trafficking of6
fenses.
The Rockefeller message was greeted with both approbation
and opprobrium, and it precipitated an intensely emotional de' Message to the Legislature, 1973 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 1, at 16.
2 Id. at 18.

1 "We must create an effective deterrent to the pushing of the broad spectrum of hard
drugs.... [S]ociety has no alternatives." Id. "I1... will ask for legislation making the penalty
for all illegal trafficking in hard drugs a life sentence in prison." Id. at 19 (emphasis in
original).
' Signorelli, A Judicial Analysis and Critique of the New Drug and Sentencing Laws, 46
N.Y.S.B.J. 9 (1973).
5 Under the proposals, "dangerous drugs" included heroin, hashish, LSD, and amphetamines. Message to the Legislature, supra note 1, at 19.
6 Id. at 19-20.
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bate. 7 With certain modifications of the original proposals, the
8
Rockefeller drug law was passed in a highly partisan atmosphere

and was signed into law on May 8, 1973. 9
Extreme sentencing provisions are the hallmark of the new
legislation, with mandatory maximum life terms for all narcotic
drug sales, for possession of narcotic drugs in quantities in excess
of one ounce, and for a variety of possession and sale offenses
involving LSD, stimulants, hallucinogens, hallucinogenic substances, and meth-amphetamines (minimum penalties being
graduated according to the quantity of the substance involved). 10 In
all, there presently exist some thirty-two different drug offenses
(exclusive of criminal attempts) for which the life sentence must be
imposed." The mandatory minimum sentences which accompany
the life term range from
one to twenty-five years depending upon the
12
felony classification.
Without doubt, this statutory scheme is the most severe in the
nation, and comes during a national trend toward the reduction of
possession offenses to the level of misdemeanors and the increasing availability of conditional discharge procedures for many first
7 Some of the reaction was extremely favorable. For example, Dr. Benjamin Watkins, a
prominent New York civic leader known as the "Mayor of Harlem," who had been the victim of numerous robberies, felt that his freedom of movement had been significantly impaired
by the threat of violence from drug-related activity. He seemed to endorse the Rockefeller
proposal when he commented that the "'harshest' treatment possible is needed to 'remove
this contagion from our community.'" N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1973, at 38, col. 6. A variety of
perspectives on the proposed legislation are represented in Law & Order & Drugs-Penal
Approach to the Drug Abuse Problem: A Panel Discussion, 2 CONTEMP. DRUG 435 (1973). The
ovenvhelming reaction of legal commentators and the press, however, was unfavorable. See
Hardt & Brooks, Social Policy on Dangerous Drugs:A Study of ChangingAttitudes in New York
and Overseas, 48 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 48, 96 (1973): "The timing of the Act is unique, coming...
at a time when use of heroin ... has been declining for a year"; N.Y. Times, May 4, 1973,
at 1, col. 6 (New York Civil Liberties Union declaring passage of law as "one of the most
ignorant, irresponsible, and inhumane acts in the history of the state"); N.Y. Times, Jan.
15, 1973, at 14, col. 1 (labelling proposal as "Archie Bunker Law" and "completely
unworkable"); N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1973, at 40, col. 2 (editorial characterizing proposal as
"simplistic" and "lock-'em-up-for-life" program); N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1973, at 29, col. 1.
s N.Y. Times, May 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
1 N.Y. Laws 1973, c. 276, p. 1040.
10 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
11 Id.
12 Upon

a conviction of a class A-I drug felony the minimum sentence permitted under
the law is 15 years' imprisonment, and the sentencing judge has the discretion to impose a
minimum term of up to 25 years. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00-3(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
The mandatory minimum upon conviction of an A-2 felony is from six to eight and
one-third years' imprisonment. Id. § 70.00-3(a)(ii). The mandatory minimum in the case of
an A-3 drug felony is one year, and the sentencing judge may impose a minimum not
exceeding eight and one-third years. Id. at § 70.00-3(a)(iii).
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offenders.' 3 Furthermore, although the sale of narcotic drugs is
almost universally a felony, New York is one of only four jurisdictions that dictate the imposition of a life sentence.' 4 Moreover, the
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years (with an option of
imposing a minimum of twenty-five years) accompanying the conviction of an A-1 felony, the most serious classification, exceeds
that of any other state that provides life sentences for drug offenses.' 5 Only the laws relating to marijuana remain substantially
as they were prior to the 1973 legislation, permitting considerable
judicial leniency for relatively minor offenses such as possession of
small quantities for "personal use."'16
New York's new laws have stimulated a wideranging debate,
both philosophical and legal, concerning their criminological utility
and ethical propriety. A comprehensive appraisal of the constitutionality or the efficacy of these laws is beyond the scope of this
Note. This Note will, instead, examine the laws from the perspective of the prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment
found in the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 7 The eighth amendment's prohibition against the imposition
of such punishment by the federal government is made applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 1 8 The proscription limits not only the mode of permissible punishment, but also the character of the substantive
conduct that may become the object of criminal sanctions, as well as
the extent or degree of those sanctions.' 9
13 NATIONAL COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, SECOND REPORT, DRUG USE IN
AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, App., vol. 3, at 244 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECOND
REPORT].

14 California, Connecticut, and Louisiana additionally mandate life imprisonment. See
text accompanying notes 178-81 infra.
15 Id.
16 A. ROSENBLATT, NEW YORK'S NEW DRUG LAWS AND SENTENCING STATUTES 37-39

(1973). Penalties provided for mere possession range from not more than one year's
imprisonment, with the availability of a conditional discharge for the first offense (possession
of less than one-quarter ounce), to a maximum term of 5 to 15 years for possession of 100
or more cigarettes containing marijuana. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.03, .09 (McKinney
Supp. 1974). This penalty structure is similar to that of a majority of other jurisdictions in
the nation, almost all of which presently classify possession of small quantities of marjuana
for "personal use" as a misdemeanor and provide for the possibility of conditional discbarge
in the case of a first offense. SECOND REPORT, App., Vol. 3, at 244.
17 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
531 (1968).
19See, e.g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964);
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24
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A bifurcated assault on the constitutionality of the New York
drug laws may be mounted under the eighth amendment. The first
approach would question the validity of the entire concept of
imposing criminal penalties upon drug-dependent persons for
drug and drug-related offenses; the second approach would focus
upon the severity of the penalty provisions in general. The purpose of this Note is to examine both approaches in order to
determine whether, under present interpretations of the eighth
amendment, the New York drug laws can withstand such an attack.
II
COMPULSIVE BEHAVIOR AND

Robinson-Powell

Since the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Robinson v. California,20 there has been little doubt that the eighth amendment limits
the type of conduct over which the criminal law may exercise
dominion. However, Robinson left unresolved, and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have failed to delineate, the exact scope
of those limitations.
Robinson was convicted under a California statute making it a
crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics. 2 1 In reversing the
conviction, the Supreme Court, adopting the position that narcotics
addiction is a disease and in itself involves no criminal conduct,
declared that a law making criminal the status of being an addict
violated the eighth amendment. 22 Although the Court suggested
STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
CriminalLaw, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635 (1966); Note, Effect of the Eighth Amendment- An Appraisal
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1961).
20 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
21 The statute provided:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
licensed by the. State to prescrihe and administer narcotics.
Stats. 1957, c. 1064, p. 2343, § 1 (repealed 1972).
22Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, stating:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it
a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a
venereal disease. A State might determine that the general health and welfare
require that the victims of these and other human afflictions;-be dealt with by
compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration. But, in
the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense
of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
370 U.S. at 666. The Court noted that the California statute must be considered within this
same category:
We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted [being addicted to
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that state laws punishing acts such as the acquisition or possession
of narcotics would be constitutionally permissible,23 a dissent by
Justice White pointed out the illogical character of this conclusion.
Justice White observed that if the state could not punish an
individual for having a compulsion to consume narcotics, it would
make no sense to penalize him for yielding to that compulsion: to
punish an addict for his acquisition and use of drugs is, in effect, to
punish him for a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.2 4
In Powell v. Texas, 25 a 1968 case dealing with a constitutional
challenge to a Texas public intoxication statute, the Court made an
effort to clarify the rationale of Robinson. Justice Marshall, writing
for a plurality of the court, gave Robinson a narrow reading which
de-emphasized the concept of addiction as an irresistible compulsion and focused upon the absence of an actus reus, thus inplying
that the punishment of an addict would be consistent with the
eighth amendment if he engaged in conduct in pursuit of his habit,
i.e., acquisition of narcotics.26
A dissenting opinion by Justice Fortas, joined by three members of the Court and with which Justice White's concurring
opinion substantially agreed, suggested that Robinson, in characterizing drug addiction as a disease manifested by an irresistible
compulsion to consume narcotics, prohibited punishment of the
addict for the crimes bf purchase and possession. 27 This theory of
criminal responsibility, in refusing to permit the imposition of
criminal penalties upon an individual for being in a condition he is

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

drugs] as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within
the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
at 667.
23 Id. at 664.
24 If it is "cruel and unusual punishment" to convict appellant for addiction, it is
difficult to understand why it would be any less offensive to the Fourteenth
Amendment to convict bim for use on the same evidence of use which proved he
was an addict.
at 688.
25 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
26 The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has
committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in
preventing, or . . . has committed some actus rets.
at 533.
27
Robinson stands upon a principal which... is the foundation of individual
liberty and the cornerstone of the relations between a civilized state and its citizens:
Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is
powerless to change.
at 567.
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powerless to change, is not without its difficulties. 8 As Justice
Marshall observed in the plurality opinion, any attempt to limit the
defense of drug dependence to the crimes of mere acquisition or
possession, as distinguished from the other manifestations of the
28 For discussion of the development and implications of the Robinson-Powell rationale,

see, e.g., Bonnie & Whitebread, The ForbiddenFruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into
the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 U. VA. L. REv. 971 (1970); Note,
Criminal Law: Demise of "Status-Act" Distinction in Symptomatic Crimes of Narcotic Addiction, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1053; Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635 (1966); 5 TOLEDO L. REv. 388 (1974).
Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc), is generally regarded
as the fullest judicial development of Robinson-Powel. In that case an addict claimed that his
prosecution for possession of a certain quantity of heroin, amounting to one-half of his daily
requirements, was prohibited under the eighth amendment. Although the case was decided
on other grounds, the court stated:
[I]f Robinson's deployment of the Eighth Amendment as a barrier to California's
making addiction a crime means anything, it must also mean in all logic that (1)
Congress either did not intend to expose the non-trafficking addict possessor to
criminal punishment, or (2) its effort to do so is as unavailing constitutionally as that
of the California legislature.
Id. at 452. Judge McGowan, writing for the court, further observed:
For the future, the addict, whose acquisition and possession of narcotics is
solely for his own use and who wishes to defend on these grounds [Eighth
Amendment], is surely not at a loss to know how to do so.... To the extent that he
wishes to assert that the statutes are not to be read as applicable to him, his primary
attack should... be by a motion to dismiss. Such a motion would presumably make
an' alternative claim of the constitutional defectiveness, under Robinson, of the
statutes as applied to him.
Id. at 453.
Shortly thereafter, this drug dependence defense was dealt a death blow in a lengthy
opinion by the same court in United States v. Moore, 386 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 980 (1973), wherein Robinson was given the narrow Marshall reading as involving
the absence of an actus reus. The court concluded that statutes punishing conduct, as
distinguished from status, were not within the scope of the eighth amendment prohibition.
See id at 1150-52, 1195-98.
The Note in Harvard Law Review, supra, is particularly perceptive in describing the
Pandora's box opened by a Watson-type analysis:
Considered in light of an increasingly more sophisticated science of psychiatry,
the "status one cannot change" rationale might conceivably yield results antithetical
to the criminal law itself. It has been suggested that virtually all criminality may be
the result of mental abnormality of some sort. Under this view of Robinson, the
acceptance of such a position-like the acceptance of philosophical determinismwould lead to virtual abandonment of the criminal law; for the hypothesis upon
which any system of criminal law must be founded is that individuals possess free
will and are to be held responsible for their acts.
Id. at 654 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Herbert Fingarette has recently inquired into the medical and pbilosopbical
foundations of the drug-dependence defense and has concluded that its fundamental
assumptions are insupportable. He asserts that an expansive reading of Robinson, which
would exculpate the addict from criminal liability allegedly attributable to his condition of
addiction, cannot be justified because the widespread belief that the addict's behavior is
involuntary or compulsive is not sustained by available data. Addiction and CriminalResponsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 443-44 (1975).
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addict syndrome such as public intoxication, assault, theft, and the
29
sale of narcotics, would be limitation by fiat.
The New York Court of Appeals was confronted with this
dilemma in People v. Davis,30 a 1973 case involving a constitutional
challenge to the conviction of a narcotic addict for the crimes of
possession of a dangerous drug and a hypodermic instrument. In a
unanimous opinion the court rejected what it conceded to be a
logically persuasive argument based upon the Robinson-Powell
rationale 3 1 and cautioned:

The ramifications of recognizing the asserted cruel and unusual
punishment defense, and impliedly the defense of drug dependence, are startling. The difficulty lies in knowing where to stop.
The obvious danger is that the defense will be extended to other
crimes-robberies, burglaries and the like-which 32can be shown
to arise from the compulsive craving for drugs.
The court argued for judicial restraint in this controversial area,
preferring to defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court or the
state legislature in the establishment of minimum standards of
33
criminal responsibility.
It is thus apparent that an approach which questions the
imposition of penalties for drug-related offenses upon drugdependent persons is not likely to be effective as a constitutional
challenge to the New York drug laws. Moreover, even if it should
prove successful, it would do nothing to alter the character of the
penalties to be imposed upon those whose dependence upon, or
use of, drugs has not become compulsive. In the absence of a
definitive resolution of this issue by the United States Supreme
Court-something the Court appears to be resisting 34-any hope
of successful attack along the eighth amendment route must rely
upon a demonstration that the penalty scheme of the statute
departs so substantially from that found in other jurisdictions, and
29 392 U.S. at 534.
30 33 N.Y.2d 221, 306 N.E.2d 787, 351 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 973
(1974).
31 The court observed:

Doubtless, the argument is logically appealing that if an addict cannot, consistent
with the Federal and State Constitutions, be punished for b-ing in the status or
condition of addiction, he cannot be punished for the acts of possessing for his
personal use narcotics and associated instruments . . . which acts are realistically
inseparable from the status or condition itself.
Id. at 226, 306 N.E.2d at 790, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
32 Id. at 227, 306 N.E.2d at 790, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
-3 Id. at 228, 306 N.E.2d at 791, 351 N.A.S.2d at 668-69.
'4 For a collection of cases raising the drug dependence defense, which the Supreme
Court bas refused to hear, see 5 TOLEDO L. REv. 388, 392 n.24.
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is so disproportionate to the nature of the offense, as to be shocking
to the conscience.
III
EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

As indicated earlier, the eighth amendment establishes a framework within which the criminal law must function in punishing
individuals for engaging in proscribed behavior. 35 These parameters are neither clearly delineated nor immutable, but draw their
character from "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
'3 6
progress of a maturing society.
It was first observed in 1892 by Justice Field, in a frequently
cited dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont, 37 that sentences that
are excessive-i.e., where the penalty imposed for an offense
exceeds all conceptions of proportionality when measured against
the social disutility of the conduct toward which it is directed-are
violative of the eighth amendment. 3 8 Eighteen years later, this
dissent was quoted with approval in the landmark decision in
Weems v. United States.3 9 The case involved a Philippine public
official sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor for having falsified
certain official government records. The constitutional provision at
issue was the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the
Philippine bill of rights, 40 but the Court noted that it was substantially identical to the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Although certain unusual features of the punishment
in question in Weems could arguably be regarded as inherently
cruel, 4 1 the scope of the decision was considerably broader. The
Court invalidated the sentence on the basis of its conclusion that
the punishment, when measured against the nature of the crime
"

See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.

36 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
37 144 U.S. 323 (1892).

38 The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the character mentioned [relating to mode], but against all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. The whole
inhibition is against that which is excessive ....
Id. at 339-40.
39 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
40 Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691 (repealed 1966).
41 Section 56 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands declared that the punishment
should include, inter alia, hard, painful labor, constant enchainment, life-long surveillance
following discharge from custody, and permanent loss of rights of property disposition. 217
U.S. at 363-64.
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and the character of the offender, was clearly excessive, observing
that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense."4 2
That the Supreme Court in Weems enunciated a fundamental
43
principle of American criminal jurisprudence seems indisputable.
Achieving unanimity in the development of standards by which
proportionality is to be gauged is, however, quite another matter.
If the eighth"amendment is to be applied to claims of excessive
punishment with precision and equality, manifestly the subjective
conceptions of individual judges concerning contemporary standards of decency cannot supply the constitutional yardstick by
which the permissible length of a prison term is to be measured. It
is essential that objective standards of judicial review be developed.
The search for such objective constitutional standards, which had
its genesis in Weems some sixty years ago, has been most clearly
articulated only during the present decade.
In recent years the eighth amendment has undergone a process of rationalization that has transformed it from what was
initially a narrow prohibition against forms of punishment offensive to contemporary ethical norms into what is essentially a doctrine of substantive due process tempered by decency and a respect
for the dignity of the individual. As a result of this process, the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has acquired a
contemporary significance and is likely to become even more
important in the future.
A.

The Offense, The Offender, and a Penological Analysis
of The Punishment
Several fundamental considerations recurrently emerge from
the case law as bearing upon the proportionality of a given
punishment to a particular crime. 44 The courts commonly appraise
217 U.S. at 367.
4'But see Packer, supra note 19, at 1074, where it is argued that Weems is the only
Supreme Court decision which "comes even close to upsetting a conviction on this ground."
Professor Packer regards the case as "much closer to the conventional view that cruel and
unusual punishment is a matter of mode not proportion than it is usually thought to he." Id.
at 1075 (footnote omitted).
44 The seminal case in this area of the law is prohably Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910). See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court of California
has developed the most systematic procedure for an evaluation of constitutional challenges
under the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. One of the most prominent
cases in which this analysis was employed is In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105
Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972), wherein the court invalidated the state's recidivist statute that
mandated the imposition of a life sentence upon a defendant convicted of a second offense
of indecent exposure. The court developed a tripartite test of proportionality: (1) examining
42
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the nature of the criminal conduct involved and the character of
the individual offender in an attempt to reach some conclusion
concerning the magnitude of the social danger each represents.
Consideration is also given to the degree of punishment provided
for the offense, its penological ramifications, and the possible
45
objectives of the legislature in establishing such a penalty.
1. The Offense: Some Perspective
High on the list of legislative priorities in the determination of
the penological treatment to be accorded an offense is the danger
to society presented by the proscribed conduct. The National
Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse concluded from its
research that "[a]U potent psychoactive drugs have been associated
with crime, delinquency, heightened aggression, mental illness,
reckless or negligent operation of a motor vehicle or other dangerous machinery and other forms of antisocial behavior. 46 Thus,
there can be no doubt that a legislature manifests a legitimate
concern when it attempts to subject the use of drugs to stringent
control. It is only when the legislative response exceeds the scope
of its authority that judicial intervention is warranted.
Ranked by the National Commission in descending order of
their propensity to produce violent behavior are the following
drugs: alcohol, 47 stimulants, 48 hallucinogens, 49 and opiates. 50 Iron"the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of
danger both present to society"; (2) comparing "the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed in the samejurisdiction for different offenses which... must be deemed more
serious"; and (3) comparing "the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for
the same offense in otherjurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional provision." Id.
at 425-27, 503 P.2d at 930-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-28 (emphasis in original). The
California court only recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach, and refined its
analysis in In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974). The court's
approach forms the basis for the mode of analysis used in this Note. See also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 938 (1974); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972); State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970).
45 See, e.g.,
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938
(1974); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); Workman v.
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194
N.W.2d 827 (1972).
46 SECOND REPORT, supra note 13, at 156.
47 "Alcohol, the most commonly used drug, is strongly associated with violent crime and
with reckless and negligent operation of motor vehicles." Id. at 165.
48 Some evidence suggests that stimulants tend to be related to assaultive hehavior, but
it is presently inconclusive. See id.
49 "Except in relatively rare instances generally related to drug-induced panic and toxic
reactions, users of hallucinogens, . . . are not inclined toward assaultive criminal behavior."
Id.
50 Use of opiates, especially heroin, is associated with acquisitive crimes such as
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ically, the penalties imposed under New York law for abuse of
burglary and shoplifting, ordinarily committed for the purpose of securing money
to support dependence. Assaultive offenses are significantly less likely to be committed by these opiate users, especially in comparison with users of alcohol,
amphetamines and barbiturates.
Id.
There is substantial support for the conclusion that the proscription of these substances,
accompanied by severe criminal penalties, actually results in an increase in acquisitive crimes,
since free market mechanisms operate to inflate the price of narcotics to such an extent that
addicts are compelled to engage in illicit conduct to maintain their dependence. Some
insight into the dimensions of the problem may be gained by performing a few simple
calculations: "[R]ecent estimates of the daily cost of supporting a [heroin] habit have ranged
from $20 to $100, fluctuating according to the availability and location." Id at 174.
Computed on an annual basis, this ranges from $7,300 to $36,500. Combined with the fact
that the products of burglaries and robberies commonly can be sold on the blackmarket for
only 20 to 40 percent of actual value, tbe addict "may be expected to steal in property an
amount ranging from $25,000 to $50,000 per year." Id. at 175. On the upper end of the
scale, the maximum sum could reach more than $150,000 per year. Few heroin addicts are
engaged in legitimate occupations that produce such income.
Greenberg and Adler provide additional support for the proposition that drug dependence is usually productive of nonviolent acquisitive crime:
[L]eaving aside the sensational, irresponsible, often politically motivated attempts to
attribute all manner of heinous crimes to addicts, much of the scholarly literature
concludes that violent crimes are rarely committed by individuals while addicted
because of the calming effects of the opiates. ....
For instance, in a widely
referenced report published by the New York City Police Department in 1966,
while 27 percent of all arrests were for felonious assault and 21 percent for
burglary, among all addict arrests only 5 percent were for felonious assault while 41
percent were for burglary. These findings have been replicated in the official arrest
records of several large cities.
Greenberg & Adler, Crime and Addiction: An Empirical Analysis of the Literature, 1920-1973, 3
CONTEMP. DRUG 221, 244 (1974) (citations omitted).
The inflammatory rhetoric alluded to by Greenberg and Adler inhibits reasoned
discussion and thwarts objective analysis of the problem of drug abuse. The Rockefeller
Message exemplifies this kind of counterproductive language: "The hard drug pusher
destroys lives just as surely as and far more cruelly than a cold-blooded killer." Message to the
Legislature, supra note 1, at 19.
Even less justifiable is the appearance of such hyperbole in judicial commentary. A
flagrant example is to be found in People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398
(3d Dep't 1974):
It is urged upon the court that the crime of simply transferring... hard drugs
from one person to another is not of such a grade of normal [sic] turpitude or
depravity as "assassins, homicidal incendiaries and kidnappers.". . . [Tjhe insidious
effect of hard drugs has been reasonably shown ... to exceed the moral turpitude
of those classes of criminals by ultimately being a prior contributing factor in many
instances to those particular crimes.
Id. at 80, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07. Thus, the court clearly implied that there exists a
demonstrable causal relationship between trafficking in hard drugs and the commission of
arson, murder, and kidnapping-a proposition wholly lacking in statistical support.
A startling counterpoint to the discouraging American experience is provided by the
British system of opiate narcotic treatment.
[A] licensed dependent can obtain high-quality inexpensive heroin, methadone, or
morphine from clinics ... to maintain dependence ....
There is very little illicit
traffic in Great Britain. There is very little crime associated with British dependents.
A substantial percentage of English dependents hold regular employment and
the spread of heroin dependence has been contained.
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proportional to the
those same drugs are almost precisely inversely
51
degree of social danger they represent.
The extent of the disproportionality in the treatment of those
who violate laws relating to the control of narcotics, hallucinogens,
and stimulants stands in sharp relief when contrasted with the
treatment of those who abuse alcohol. According to the Commission report, "in the case of homicide and other assaultive offenses,
alcohol was used by at least half of the offenders directly prior to
the crime," and alcohol was also "reported as a factor in 67% of the
sexual crimes against children and 39% of the sexually*aggressive
acts against women. ' 52 Another recent study issued an even
harsher indictment of alcohol, noting that it
not only produces a serious dependence and does inevitable
organic damage even to the relatively light user, but its use is also
intimately and causally related to homicide, other crimes of
violence to persons and property, more than half of all arrests,
of
suicide, traffic death and injury, loss of work and 5impairment
3
social relationships, accidents and mental illness.
Given the unrivaled potential for social harm which accompanies the use of this "drug," one would expect its abuse to be
attended by criminal sanctions paralleling or exceeding those for
other drug offenses. Again, ironically, alcohol abuse does not even
54 Instead, its
appear in the list of Article 220 drug offenses.
availability is only minimally controlled and its merchandising is
the object of a major commercial industry. It is the constitutional
duty of the judiciary to insure that a measure of proportionality
inheres in the criminal law, and such a comparative analysis recognizing this inconsistency of treatment is necessary to its deliberations.
At least one commentator has urged that since stimulants,
hallucinogens, and to a considerable extent even narcotics, have
little impact, due to their pharmacological properties, beyond their
effect upon the biological system of the individual consumer, any
criminal sanction is inappropriate. He asserts that "[a]t best
Israel & Denardis, The Irrationalityof a Law Enforcement Approach to OpiateNarcotics, 50 J. URB.
L. 631, 678 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
51 See note 12 supra. Only narcotic drugs fall within the A-I classification. N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 220.21 (McKinney Supp. 1974). A-2 felonies include abuse of narcotics, hallucinogens, and stimulants. Id. § 220.18. Procurement of alcoholic beverages for a minor is a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $50, or by imprisonment for not more
than five days, or both. N.Y. Aco. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 65-a (McKinney 1970).
52 SECOND REPORT, supra note 13, at 157-58 (citations omitted).

5 Israel & Denardis, supra note 50, at 659.
5 See N.Y. Aco. BEV. CONTROL LAw § 65 (McKinney 1970).
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the proponents of severe penalties can argue that the crime involves moral turpitude because [the user] is being reckless or
'55
grossly negligent of the safety of himself and other citizens.
Under this view, even conceding that the issue of criminal treatment is a legislative one not inherently implicating constitutional
considerations, the author contends that penal sanctions "must be
employed in a manner which recognizes drug use as comparable to
lesser crimes, such as speeding, prostitution, drunkenness, jaywalk'5 6
ing, and riding a motorcyle without a helmet.
There remains considerable controversy over the precise
criminogenic consequences of drug consumption, and legislative
decisions in this uncertain area should be accorded wide latitude.
Legislative prerogative cannot, however, be constitutionally exercised with total disdain for contemporary scientific conclusions
that, with the exception of alcohol, drug use is primarily anti-social
and/or self-injurious and is only indirectly productive of criminal
activity-largely as a result of the economic consequences of drug
57
prohibition itself.
2. The Punishment
The New York penalty scheme, it will readily be observed,
does evidence an intention to graduate the punishment according
to the quantity of the drug involved. 58 This graduated scheme,
which appears to reflect the legislature's assumption that the severity of the offense is directly proportional to the quantity of the
prohibited substance possessed, is open to criticism as being overly
simplistic in its rationale. The harshest criticism of the legislation,
however, has been directed not at the concept of graduation, but at

11

Wheeler, supra note 19, at 863.

56 Id. at 864.

57 Id. at 863.
58 See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
For example, penalties for possession of narcotics range from class A misdemeanor (less
than 0.5 oz.) to class A-I felony (2 oz. or more). Similarly, possession of narcotic preparations is classified anywhere from an A misdemeanor (less than 0.5 oz.) to a B felony (2 oz. or
more). Possession of LSD ranges from an A misdemeanor (less than 1 mg.) to A-2 felony (25
mg. or more), as does possession of hallucinogens (less than 25 mg. to 625 mg. or more),
hallucinogenic substances (less than 1 g. to 25 g. or more), and stimulants (less than 1 g. to
10 g. or more).
With the exception of a catch-all section providing a D felony penalty with no limitation
as to quantity, possession-with-intention-to-sell crimes are uniformly A-3 felonies.
Sale of narcotic drugs ranges from A-3 (less than 0.125 oz.) to A-I (1 oz. or more) felony
classification. Sale of LSD (less than 1 mg. to 5 mg. or more), methamphetamines (less than
0.125 oz. to 0.5 oz. or more), and hallucinogens (less than 25 mg. to 125 mg. or more)
ranges from D felony to A-2 felony.
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its mandatory sentences, 59 particularly the mandatory life sentence
accompanying conviction of a class A felony. 60 It is this aspect of
the law upon which the eighth amendment debate focuses.
The courts have developed two conflicting approaches to the
application of the eighth amendment to claims of excessive
punishment when indeterminate sentences 61 are involved. The
California Supreme Court in In re Lynch 6 2 held that the constitutionality of such a sentence must be judged on the basis of the
maximum term allowable, since the prisoner's release prior to
serving the full term is solely within the discretion of parole
authorities. 63 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Michigan
in People v. Lorentzen,6 4 confronted with a similar challenge, concluded that the sentence must be judged by the minimum period
of service required before the prisoner becomes eligible for
65
parole.
Although the New York Court of Appeals has never addressed
the issue in precisely this context, it would appear that the court
would concur with the California approach because the prisoner
sentenced to an indeterminate term in New York has no absolute
right of release until completion of the maximum term. Qualified
by the possibility of the discretionary intervention of the parole
board after service of the minimum sentence, the indeterminate
term of imprisonment is, in effect, a sentence for the maximum
term prescribed.6 6 Recently, a New York court at the county level
rejected, by implication, the Michigan approach when it commented: "The Court will not sit idly by and justify an unconstitutional deprivation of rights on the ground that an administrative
agency may later come along and correct . . . the injustice." 67
'9 See, e.g., Signorelli, supra note 4; N.Y. Times articles cited note 7 supra.
60 See note 12 supra.
61 An indeterminate sentence has been defined as "[a] sentence to imprisonment for the
maximum period defined by law, subject to termination by the parole board or other agency
at any time after service of the minimum period." BLAcK's LAv DICTIONARY 911 (rev. 4th ed.
1968).
62 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
63 Id. at 415-19, 503 P.2d at 924-26, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 220-22.
64 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
65Id. at 176, 194 N.W.2d at 831, citing People v. Mire, 173 Mich. 357, 362, 138 N.W.
1066, 1068 (1912).
66See People v. Washington, 264 N.Y. 335, 338, 191 N.E. 7, 8 (1934).
67 People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 739, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008 (Monroe Co. Ct.
1974), rev'd sub nom. People v. McNair, 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't
1975). With the exception of the Mosley court, none of the courts considering the constitutionality of the law have dealt with the issue explicitly. The Third Department, however,
implicitly rejected this position when it observed that "[i]t is to be noted that there is no
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If the California view were adopted, the court would be
required to assess the permissibility of the punishment imposed
upon conviction of a class A felony as if the offender had been
sentenced to life imprisonment. Conversely, if the indeterminate
sentence were judged according to the mandatory minimum
period of incarceration required before the prisoner became
eligible for parole, the likelihood of invalidation under the eighth
amendment would be sharply reduced, except under circumstances where the mandatory minimum sentence in itself was so
excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
In the case of a class A-1 felony, where the sentencing judge
must impose a minimum term of fifteen years, and may elect up to
a twenty-five year minimum, the approach employed would be of
lesser significance than in the case of either a class A-2 or A-3
felony where the mandatory minimums range from six to eight
and one-third years and from one to eight and one-third years
respectively. Notwithstanding the availability of differing minimum
sentences, in each of the above instances the prisoner has no
constitutional right to release from prison, ever: if his application
for parole is denied in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the correction law, he must serve a life sentence.
Indeterminate sentences with mandatory minimums and
maximums such as those prescribed for class A felonies under the
New York Penal Law, although increasingly regarded with disfavor
in some quarters, 68 have widely been upheld against eighth
reason to believe that any but the most hardened anti-social ... individuals will actually be
incarcerated for life." People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 77, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404 (3d
Dep't 1974).
Mosley, McNair, Venable, and People v. Broadie, 45 App. Div. 2d 649, 360 N.Y.S.2d 906
(2d Dep't 1974), were among eight cases that raise a constitutional challenge to the law
argued before the Court of Appeals on March 24, 1975, N.Y.L.J., March 13, 1975, at 7, col.
6. During the marathon session, lasting four hours, the primary focus of the attack was upon
allegations that the mandatory life sentences violated the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. The court is expected to render a decision on the
issue by early July. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1975, at 38, col. 6.
Parole may be viewed as a conditional mitigation of the full term which would otherwise
be served by permitting a "constructive incarceration" of those who are no longer regarded
as sufficiently dangerous to society to warrant actual confinement. See Hardy v. Warden of
Queens House of Detention for Men, 56 Misc. 2d 332, 334, 288 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (Sup. Ct.
Queens Co. 1968).
'8 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws was highly critical of
the concept of mandatory minimum sentences, stating flatly that
mandatory minimum penalties are clearly undesirable. While mandatory minimum
penalties and restrictions on probation and parole are defended as deterrents, ...
studies point out that, as they actually operate, the certainty of punishment they
supposedly offer is illusory. . ..
Another argument in favor of mandatory minimum sentences in narcotics
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amendment challenges.6 9 On the other hand, they have, although
with less frequency, been declared unconstitutional both per se and
as applied to an individual defendant or class of defendants when
the sentencing statute was not invalid on its face.7 0 Thus, in each
case, the court must determine whether the punishment imposed is
so disproportionate to the crime committed by the offender as to
be degrading to human dignity and shocking to a balanced sense of
justice. 7 l A conclusion on this issue cannot be reached without
taking into consideration the character of the defendant, the circumstances surrounding his conduct, the nature of the crime itself,
and the interests of society in discouraging and punishing such
behavior.
The most frequently articulated objection to such sentences is
their total failure to acknowledge that there exist differences
among individual defendants, especially with regard to rehabilitacases in particular is that they provide leverage, which will induce a suspect to
cooperate with law enforcement. It is submitted, however, that, if he fails to
cooperate, it is inappropriate to subject him to punishment which is not warranted
by the seriousness of his offense, the need to rehabilitate or incapacitate him, or by
considerations of deterrence and general prevention.
2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS, in

REPORT ON DRUG OFFENSES 1111-12 (1970).
The ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice reached similar conclusions:
Because there are so many factors in an individual case which cannot be
predicted in advance, it is unsound for the legislature to require that the court
impose a minimum period of imprisonment which must be served before an
offender becomes eligible for parole or for the legislature to prescribe such a
minimum term itself.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 142 (1967).

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice also
rejected mandatory minimum sentences:
Within any classification of offenses, differences exist in both the circumstances
and nature of the illegal conduct and in the offenders. Mandatory provisions
deprive judges and correctional authorities of the ability to base their judgments on
the seriousness of the violations and the particular characteristics and potential for
rehabilitation of the offender.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE

11 (1967).
" In People v. Weiss, 78 Misc. 2d 792, 358 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Suffolk Co. Ct. 1974), the
court rejected the defendant's motion for dismissal of a charge of criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree on the ground that the sentencing statute provided
a punishment which was cruel and unusual. The court noted that "[f]ederal courts across the
breadth of the nation have upheld mandatory minimum terms of greater duration." Id. at
794, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The opinion cited a series of recent federal cases sustaining
minimum mandatory sentences ranging from five to ten years for a variety of drug crimes.
70 See, e.g., Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335, 363 (1970).
71 Id. See also note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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tive potential, and variations in the circumstances of the particular
offense which are significant factors in evaluating the degree of
danger to society. Not only has the legislature failed to provide for
these differences in the penalty scheme, but it has also precluded,
to a considerable extent, prosecutorial, judicial, or correctional
authorities from taking cognizance of these factors in tailoring
punishments to individual cases.
Commenting on the sentencing provisions of the New York
legislation, Judge Ernest Signorelli of the Suffolk County Court
observed:
In my judgment, an inherent potential for injustice is built into
these laws by placing the judge in a straitjacket wherein he is
deprived of the discretion to evaluate each case on its own merits
72
and be merciful or harsh, as the particular case may warrant.
A similar concern was echoed by Judge Andrew Celli in People
v. Mosley, 73 a recent New York case declaring the mandatory
maximum life term for the commission of an A-3 drug felony (sale
of a controlled substance in the third degree) violative of the eighth
amendment. Judge Celli's analytical model was premised on In re
Lynch,74 and his objections to the sentence were similar:
The Court is not permitted to take into consideration the quantity of narcotic sold .... not allowed to consider the nature of
the transaction .... the relationship of the parties .... nor the
motivation of sale . .. . nor the seller's status in the narcotic
. Life imprisonment is required 75in
distribution system . .
all cases, and in all cases the law thus presumes the worst.

In concluding that the law offended the conscience of the court
"beyond a reasonable doubt," Judge Celli further noted that the
court
is not allowed to consider the status of the buyer, whether addict
or non-addict. Nor may it consider the qualities of the offender,
rehabilitawhether young or old, family man or not, high or low
tive potential, value or potential value to society. 76
The essence of the Mosley opinion was that the failure of the
legislature to establish a rationally graduated penalty structure
which would permit the court to consider these individualized
Signorelli, supra note 4, at 18.
78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1974), rev'd sub nom., People v.
McNair, 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't 1975).
74 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). See note 44 supra.
75 78 Misc. 2d at 739-40, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
76 Id. at 740, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1008-09.
72

73
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factors militated strongly against a finding of proportionality of
punishment to crime. This view has been explicitly repudiated by
the New York courts subsequently considering the same issues.
In People v. Broadie,7 s the Second Department upheld the
imposition of a life sentence with a minimum term of one year
upon a twenty-four-year-old first offender for the sale of 2.25
ounces of cocaine. The court acknowledged the legislation as
inherently harsh and even unjust, but concluded that the "sentencing provisions of the new drug law represent [a] permissible
exercise of legislative power and are constitutional. 17 9 The court
emphasized the deleterious impact of drug trafficking upon the
community and concluded that
[b]ased upon the evils which the Governor and the Legislature
found to be inherent in the use and sale of narcotics and related
substances, punishment of imprisonment for life... may not as a
matter of law be held to be so severe as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.80
The test of proportionality supported by some legal scholars and
numerous judicial opinions cited above received no consideration
by the court. 8 ' The familiar litany that legislative acts are accompanied by a presumption of constitutionality was recited and the
challenge was almost summarily dismissed.
In People v. Gardner,82 a more analytical, although no more
persuasive, opinion, the Supreme Court of Westchester County
sustained the mandatory life sentence provisions of the legislation
against a constitutional attack. The court noted that the defendant's chief complaint was "with the comparative gravity ascribed
by the Legislature to the offenses charged.., and with the severity
of penalty fixed therefor. '' 83 The court cited with approval the test
of cruel and unusual punishment enunciated by Justice Brennan in
Furman v. Georgia8 4 and concluded that "the maximum sentence of
life imprisonment... is neither so inherently severe nor excessive
as to violate the Eighth Amendment."8 5 The court further obIt should be noted that the Court of Appeals has recently heard arguments in

appeals from several of the lower court cases. See note 67 supra.
78 45 App. Div. 2d 649, 360 N.Y.S.2d 906 (2d Dep't 1974).

79 Id. at 650, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
80 Id. at 653, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
81 See, e.g., notes 36-45 supra; Wheeler, supra note 19.
82 78 Misc. 2d 744, 359 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1974).
83 Id. at 748, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
84 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972).
85 78 Misc. 2d at 749, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
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served that "[t]he mere fact that ... the Legislature allowed more
lenient sentences for offenses deemed by some to represent a
greater evil, does not convert the penalties under fire in this case
into cruel and inhuman punishments. '8 6 It buttressed this conclusion with a quotation from Howard v. Fleming87 in which the United
States Supreme Court, in upholding disparate sentences imposed
upon three defendants all convicted of the same offense, observed
a reasonable
that "[u]ndue leniency in one case does not transform
88
punishment in another case to a cruel one.
Furthermore, the Gardner court supported its exercise of restraint with language from the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe: 8 9 "The comparative
gravity of criminal offenses and whether their consequences are
more or less injurious are matters for [legislative] determination."90 Although this statement is correct, if the eighth amendment is to have any meaning at all, it must mean that the legislature is not imbued with unbounded discretion in the prescription
of punishments for criminal behavior. Immediately following the
sentence quoted above, the Sullivan Court commented that
[f]or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires
consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime
was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.9 1
It was the contention of the defendant in Gardner that the mandatory sentencing provisions of the law preclude the court from
considering precisely these qualities of the offender.2
The Third Department, in People v. Venable,93 also upheld the
86 Id. at 749-50, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
87 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
s8 Id. at 136. Reliance on this language is misleading for the important reason that the

proportionality argument advanced in this Note rests not upon the demonstration of "undue
leniency in one case," but upon the conclusion that the penal law, in its entirety, manifests
the legislature's assessment of the relative severity of the various criminal offenses. Thus, the
comparative approach contrasts the particular punishment under scrutiny with the pattern
of legislative priorities inferrable from an objective appraisal of the entire sentencing scheme
reflected in the penal code and not with what might be regarded as an unduly lenient
sentence provided for any specific crime or imposed by an individual judge in a particular
case. Undue severity of a punisbment, evidenced by substantial and unjustifiable departure
from the norms of civilized society, is the constitutional litmus to be employed in applying
the eighth amendment to claims of excessive punisbment.
89 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
90 Id. at 55.
91 Id.

92 78 Misc. 2d at 747-48, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200.
93

46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398 (3d Dep't 1974).
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law against the defendant's contention that the sentence accompanying a conviction of a class A drug felony was violative of the
eighth amendment. The court relied heavily upon the opinion of
Justice Quinn in Gardner and the apparent intractability of the
drug problem in 94sustaining the law as a permissible exercise of
legislative power.
Although legislative judgments concerning the appropriate
disposition of offenders should be accorded the highest respect,
such deference ought not be invoked to justify abdication of the
judiciary's responsibility to ensure that constitutional boundaries
are not transgressed in the legislative process. But in their placing
emphasis upon legislative prerogative and in their superficial application of tests of constitutionality, the Gardner and Venable courts
appear to have effectively precluded themselves from exercising
full review of the legislature's actions.
3. Penological Purposes
The criminal law encompasses a variety of theories of punishment, chief among them incapacitation, deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and education; but it has as its singular objective the
prevention of antisocial conduct. 95 The dominant emphasis of the
penal law in recent years has been upon rehabilitation as "reflected
in the increased use of such devices of modern penology as the
indeterminate sentence, the presentence investigation, probation
and parole .... -96 Commenting in 1949 on developments in the
philosophy of punishment, the Supreme Court observed in Williams v. New York: 97 "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offend98
ers have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.
Although almost all New York penal law is a product of the
competitive interaction of the various theories of punishment,
Article 220 is unique. In enacting the 1973 drug law, the legislature eschewed contemporary emphasis on rehabilitation; by combining indeterminate life sentences with lengthy mandatory
minimum terms, it adopted an approach which emphasized incapacitation and general deterrence in the case of serious drug
offenses to the almost total exclusion of rehabilitation.
The penological utility of the indeterminate sentence is commonly regarded as deriving from the great incentive it lays before
94 Id. at 78-79, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
95 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 5 (1972).
96 Id. at 25.
97 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
98 Id. at 248.
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the prisoner to undergo rehabilitation in an effort to gain an early
release. Subject to the legislatively or judicially imposed minimums
and maximums, the correctional authority is generally free to
dispense or withhold parole on the basis of its evaluation of the
individual offender's progress toward reform. When the indeterminate sentence is combined with lengthy minimum sentences
these objectives are frustrated. Regardless of the prisoner's demonstrated rehabilitation or a determination by the parole board
that he no longer presents a threat to society, he will remain
ineligible for release until the mandatory minimum sentence has
been served.9 9
If the need to incapacitate is to be rationally related to the
offender's perceived danger to society, the indeterminate sentence
-even in the absence of mandatory minimum terms-would seem
adequate to achieve this result. The minimum sentence not only
contributes nothing to the protection of society, but it also inhibits
the operation of the system of incentives the indeterminate sentence is designed to offer. 10 0 The rationale for the lengthy mandatory minimum sentences must be found elsewhere.
Considerations of deterrence lie at the heart of the sentencing
scheme under the new drug law. The statements of Governor
Rockefeller, both accompanying the proposal of the legislation and
upon signing it into law, emphasize this theme.1 0 1 Following his
observation that programs of education and rebabilitation had not
succeeded in reducing the dimensions of the drug problem in New
York, Rockefeller urged the legislature to "create an effective
deterrent to the pushing of the broad spectrum of hard drugs."102
Although the notion of deterrence rests upon the intuitive
assumption that if undesirable consequences are attached to particular forms of behavior the incidence of such conduct will be
diminished, there is very little support for the proposition that the
assumption is applicable with equal force across the entire spectrum of criminal conduct.1 0 3 The efficacy of the deterrence
philosophy in the area of drug abuse is particularly questionable.
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
99In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 923-24, 519 P.2d 1073, 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657
(1974).
100 Id.
101 See Message to the Legislature, supra note 1, at 17-22; N.Y. Times, May 9, 1973, at 1,
col. I (Rockefeller characterizing new law as "toughest antidrug program in the nation" and
urging vigorous police enforcement and aggressive judicial application to offenders).
102 Message to the Legislature, supra note 1, at 18.
103

See generally F.

ZIMRING

& G.
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(1973).
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Administration of Justice observed that, despite stiffened penalties,
0 4
"the use of and traffic in [marijuana] appear to be increasing."1
Commenting specifically on the utility of mandatory sentences, the
Commission remarked that "the evidence as to the effects of
mandatory minimum sentences is inconclusive,"' 10 5 and therefore
favored vesting the sentencing judge with broad discretion.
Other commentators have expressed less reservation. Professor Chambliss has declared that the "evidence . . . suggests that
drug addiction . . . is relatively unaffected by the threat or the
imposition of punishment."' 10 6 Although some scholars have made
a seemingly logical argument that "general deterrence may operate
'07
effectively to prevent potential users from becoming addicts,"'
the empirical evidence available does not support this position.
Cautiously citing, among others, a California study concerning the
impact of increased criminal penalties on marijuana use, Professors
Zimring and Hawkins concluded that "available data do suggest
that increases in legislatively provided penalties for major crimes
have little impact as a marginal general deterrent in many situations where officials place great faith in such increases."' 8
Indeed even the small amount of information available on the
effect of New York's own drug law suggests that the initial consequence of the increased penalties was to drive traffic further
underground, not to decrease it.' 0 9 Dealers were encouraged to
employ fourteen and fifteen year-olds who, because they were
under sixteen, were immune from the severe penalties. 110 The
heightened hazards of dealing forced a further rise in the price of
drugs and a concomitant increase in acquisitive crimes."' By December 1973, a mere three months after the law went into effect,
the Deputy Chief Inspector of the New York Police Department
was able to conclude that "[i]t's returning to what it was before the
new law so far as street pushers and the level above them are
concerned."' "1 2 Although it cannot be concluded with certainty that
the operation of the new law has had no impact on the flow of illicit
104 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

supra note 68, at 11.
105 Id.
106

Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REv.

703, 708.
107 Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 538 (1971).
108 F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 103, at 201.
109 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
110 Id. at 46, col. 1.

"I Id. at 46, col. 2.
112

N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1973, § 4, at 4, col. 4.
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drug traffic, any minimal deterrent effect the harsh penalties
might have could hardly be considered sufficient to redeem an
otherwise excessive penalty structure.
The propensity of legislators confronted with a crime problem
to conclude that "the best hope of control lies in 'getting tough'
with criminals by increasing penalties" has been observed to be
particularly apparent in the area of regulation of dangerous
drugs. 1 13 The attractiveness of this response is enhanced by its
simplicity and economy. Its political viability is strengthened by the
knowledge that those upon whom the heightened penalties will be
14
visited rarely constitute an important segment of the electorate.'
But this reasoning yields conclusions that wholly disregard the
individual and societal costs implicit in an increased level of criminal sanctions. The dysfunctions not perceived by this narrow
perspective include the drain on the resources of the prison system
by an enlarged inmate population, the moral dilemma posed by the
infliction of what might prove to be needless punishment, increased human suffering through the prolonged separation of the
inmate from his family, the possibility of less vigorous prosecution
and reluctance on the part of judges and juries to convict where
severe penalties are involved, and higher administrative costs. 1 15
All of these considerations should be taken into account by a
legislature before it makes any significant change in sentencing
structures. How seriously the New York legislature weighed these
factors is open to question.
B.

Other Crimes in the Same Jurisdiction
A procedure frequently reflected in opinions which have systematically analyzed eighth amendment objections to the length of
legislatively prescribed sentences involves a comparative evaluation
of the penalties provided for other crimes of similar seriousness
within the same jurisdiction.' 16 The essence of this comparative
113 F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 103, at 18.
114 Id. at 18-22.

115 Id. at 18-22, 66-69.
11 See notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra. Although gradation of offenses in the
hierarchy of criminal behavior involves certain difficulties arising from the absence of
quantifiable comparative criteria and thus inevitably yields conclusions which are broad and
imprecise, there is some general agreement that the gravity of criminal conduct is directly
related to the frequency and magnitude of concomitant personal injury and/or property
damage it produces. For example, assaultive behavior, i.e., that threatening injury to human
life, and conduct which involves a high risk of significant impairment of property interests, is
commonly regarded as indicative of serious criminal offenses. See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519
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technique is a recognition of the principle that offenders committing crimes involving approximately the same degree of social
1
danger should be similarly treated by the criminal justice system.' 7
Thus,
if the Court finds the apparent dangers of one criminal activity
to be substantially less serious than the apparent dangers of
crimes carrying equal penalties, or if the Court cannot find a
substantial difference between a crime carrying a severe punishment and crimes carrying minor punishments, it must act on that
basis to find the challenged punishment disproportionate.' 1 8
The rationale for this procedure was succinctly stated by the
California Supreme Court in In re Foss:.. 9
[T]he comparison between punishments imposed for more serious crimes with the punishment in question is based upon the
assumption that although isolated excessive penalties may occasionally be enacted through "honest zeal . . . generated in

response to transitory public emotion," the vast majority of
punishments may be deemed to have been enacted with due
regard for constitutional restraints. 20
The findings of the National Commission on Marihuana and
Drug Abuse offer support for the conclusion that opiates, hallucinogens, and, to a lesser extent, stimulants are not correlated to
any significant degree with assaultive behavior.' 2' Furthermore,
although it is undisputed that opiates tend to produce acquisitive
crimes, there is nothing inherent in the pharmacological properties
of the drug which makes this condition inevitable. 22 Notwithstanding these considerations, the wholesale imposition of life sentences
on drug offenders represents the harshest and most inflexible
P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1972); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); accord,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 68, at 1111-32.
17 For example, in rejecting B felony classification for small scale trafficking in
dangerous or abusable drugs, the National Commission observed:
[I]t would be punished on the same level as such offenses as unaggravated
kidnapping, unaggravated forcible rape, and unaggravated robbery ....
It is
submitted that such treatment is not justified by the risks posed by these drugs ....
[TJhe distributor does not act against the wishes of his "victim" but satisfies his
"victim's" demand.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWvS, supra note 68, at
1113-14.
118 Wheeler, supra note 19, at 863.
119 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
120 Id. at 927, 519 P.2d at 1084, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 660 (Burke, J.).
121 SECOND REPORT, supra note 13, at 164-65.
122 See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
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treatment of any broad class of crimes recognized by the New York
a2 3
Penal Law.
Aside from the drug offenses which are classified as class A
felonies, 24 only murder in the first and second degrees, 2 5 arson in
the first degree, 2 6 kidnapping in the first degree, 2 7 and attempted
murder of a police officer are similarly categorized.' 28 However,
unlike the latter group of crimes (and the lesser drug crimes), class
29
A drug felonies are subject to a restriction on plea bargaining.
Thus, where an indictment charges the commission of any class A
drug crime or an attempt to commit such a felony, the prosecutor's
freedom of negotiation is limited to the acceptance of a guilty plea
to nothing less than a class A-3 felony, which still carries the
mandatory life term. Of course, a person indicted on an A-3 felony
charge may not plea bargain to even this limited extent since his
charge is irreducible. 30 There is, however, one instance in which a
reduced sentence is available to one charged with an A-3 felony;
this occurs when the defendant agrees to actively cooperate in the
3
investigation or prosecution of any Article 220 drug offense.' '
123

The word "broad" is used advisedly. Since Sept. 1, 1974,

§ 60.06 of

the N.Y. Penal

Law mandates the imposition of the death penalty upon conviction of the murder of a police
or prison officer or any premeditated murder committed by one serving a life sentence.
124 See note 12 supra.
125 N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.27, .25 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
126 Id. § 150.20.
127 Id. § 135.25.
128 Id. § 110.05(1).
129 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAw § 220.10(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974) with id.

§ 220.10(4).
130 N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAw § 220.10(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974). This provision was
attacked as violative of the equal protection clause in People v. Gardner, 78 Misc. 2d 744,
359 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1974). The defendent urged that the restriction
unconstitutionally discriminates against a particular class of offenders in that it "infringe[s]
upon the rights of the class comprised of those indicted for the commission of A-3 drug
offenses." Id. at 753, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 205. While noting that the procedure of plea
bargaining has become an institutionalized part of the criminal process, the court held that
the defendant had no constitutional right to negotiate a plea to anything less than the
complete indictment. Id. at 754, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
131 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 65.00(I)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). If this alternative is used, the
defendant will be paroled for life. Id. § 65.00-3(a)(ii).
Referring to this provision, State Senator Chester Straub observed that it "could have
been written by the counsel for organized crime." N.Y. Times, May 8, 1973, at 28, col. 7.
The Senator was concerned that the judicial process would clearly identify the informer
through the distinctive treatment he received, thus marking him for retribution. Id.
Although more than 200 persons have been sentenced to life terms of imprisonment
and in excess of 2,500 have been indicted upon drug felonies carrying the mandatory life
sentence, only seven major crime figures have qualified for lifetime parole under this
provision. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
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This revised sentencing structure seems especially harsh in light
of the fact that murderers, arsonists, and kidnappers are permitted
to negotiate pleas while those indicted on class A drug felony
charges have no hope of eluding the life sentence except through
acquittal.
The laws relating to attempt are similarly skewed against the
drug offender. While an attempt to commit murder, arson, or
13 2
kidnapping is one full felony class below the substantive crime,'
attempted commission of a class A drug felony is treated as a felony
of the same class as the actual commission of the substantive
offense.' 33 Only an attempted murder of a police officer is accorded similar "same class" treatment. 34 However, even attempted
murder of a police officer, although treated as a class A-i felony,
cannot be punished as severely as the substantive crime. Furthermore, although the parole board, in the usual case, may grant an
absolute discharge to any parolee under an indeterminate
sentence-even one convicted of the attempted murder of a police
officer' 35-prior to the expiration of the full maximum term, the
class A drug offender is required to remain on parole for the
36
duration of his life.'
A comparison of the sentences provided for class A drug
offenses with the treatment of crimes regarded as less serious by
the legislature highlights this lack of proportionality. Arson in the
second degree, 37 burglary in the first degree,13 8 kidnapping in the
second degree, 3 9 manslaughter in the first degree, 40 rape in the
first degree,' 4' and robbery in the first degree 4 2 are all class B
felonies requiring a mandatory indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of one year and a maximum of twenty-five years' imprisonment. 43 Plea bargaining, however, is unbridled and absolute
132 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
133 Id. § 110.05(1)-(3).
114 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §110.05-1.

135 A person convicted of the attempted murder of a police officer may be unconditionally discharged from his sentence after five years of unrevoked parole. N.Y. CORREC.
LAW § 212(8) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
136

Id.

137 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
138 Id. § 140.30.
139 Id. § 135.20.
140 Id. § 125.20.
141Id. § 130.35.
142Id. § 160.15.
143 Id. §§ 70.00(2)(b), (3).
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discharge of sentence is available after a five year period of
44
unrevoked parole.1
In People v. Mosley,' 45 the court compared the penalties for
drug offenses with the sanctions for what it deemed far more
serious crimes to illustrate its conclusion that the drug law's sentencing structure was disproportionate to the point of being unconstitutional:
[A] person who kills intentionally, who causes serious physical
injury in the course of a robbery, who rapes a child, who blows
up an occupied building, faces a maximum term of 25 years, or a
maximum of 30 years for a series of such acts before being
imprisoned on any one of them. Although imprisonment is
mandatory, no minimum term may be imposed ... unless the
court gives reasons for concluding that the best interest of the
public require it because of the nature and circumstances of the
crime and of the history and character of the defendant. Such a
person will not remain onparole for the rest of his life, nor will
he be denied the opportunity to engage in plea bargaining-the
traditional means by which the courts mitigate the punishment
required by the legislature for a crime when the circumstances
of
14 6
the particular case and the interest of justice require it.
In view of the foregoing analysis there can be no doubt that
class A drug offenders are treated more harshly than any other
class of criminal offenders in the entire penal system. Such treatment is without foundation in logic and without precedent in law.
C.

The Law in Other Jurisdictions: A Measure of Proportionality
A further judicial technique for determining the constitutionality of punishment schemes is to make an assessment of contemporary legislative trends, with particular regard for model legislation proposals, and a comparison of the penalties provided by the
statute under scrutiny with the sentencing provisions in other
jurisdictions for substantially similar offenses.' 47 This method of
assessing the proportionality between crime and punishment finds
its justification in the belief that a majority of jurisdictions will have
enacted statutes within the parameters of the eighth amendment.
If the penalty under scrutiny deviates substantially from the national norm, it might reasonably be concluded that it was the
144 N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAw § 220.10(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.Y. CoRREc. LAw

§ 212(8) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
145 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1974).
146Id. at 741, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1009-10147See notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra.
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product of an overzfealous and ill-considered legislative response to
a grave social problem. 1 48 An examination of the status and direction of drug legislation on a nationwide basis is useful not only as a
means of highlighting further indications of disproportionality but
also as a method for providing some objective measure of the
to which the Supreme
elusive "evolving standards of decency"
49
Dulles.'
v.
Trop
in
alluded
Court
A brief comparative evaluation of the sentencing provisions of
other jurisdictions clearly demonstrates the relative severity of the
New York legislation. For example, the modal punishment for the
possession of narcotics is five years or less,15 0 and nine states treat
possession of narcotics, irrespective of amount, as a misdemeanor
by New York standards, i.e., as punishable by not more than one
year in jail.15 1 In addition, only Illinois and New York provide for
life sentences when mere possession is involved. However, in
Illinois, the sentence is discretionary with the sentencing judge and
is available only when the defendant is found guilty of possessing
5 2
more than thirty grams (approximately one ounce) of narcotics,1
while in New York, the life sentence is mandatory whenever the
offender is found to possess one ounce or more of narcotics.' 5 3
The penalties provided for possession of narcotics with intent
to sell are almost uniformly higher than those imposed for offences
of mere possession.' 5 4 Here, the most common sentence available
148 See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 427, 503 P.2d 921, 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 228.

356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
150 Twenty states provide penalties for possession not exceeding five years: ARK. STAT.
149

§ 82-2104(a) (Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-481(a) (Supp. 1974); DEL.
LAws, tit. 16 § 4753 (1975); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(e) (Supp. 1974-75); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 329-42(b) (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(c)(1) (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 218A.990(5) (Baldwin 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287(a)(1) (1957); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 94C, § 34 (Supp. 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1070(41)(4)(a) (Supp. 1974); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 152.15(2)(1) (Supp. 1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(d)(1) (Supp. 1974);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 54-133c (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24: 21-20(a)(1) (Supp.
1974-75); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-11-23(B)(5) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(d)
(Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(3) (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 21-28-4.01c(l) (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510.49(d)(1) (Supp. 1974); S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § 39-17-95 (Supp. 1974).
'" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-1010(6a) (Cum. Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 204.401(3) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974-75); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(b) (Spec. Pamphlet
1974-75); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1432(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, c. 84, § 4224(b) (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 60A-4-401(c) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.41(2r)(a) (1974); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-347.31(c) (Supp. 1973).
152 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 1402(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
13 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18-1 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
Is" It should be noted that many jurisdictions only recognize the two broad categories
of possession and sale.
ANN.
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(provided by thirteen states) is a term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years. 155 Ten other states provide for sentences not
exceeding ten years' imprisonment. 156 Seven more states permit a
maximum term of twenty years' imprisonment, 157 and Illinois
provides for a term of from one to twenty years in certain instances. 15 8 Idaho permits the court to establish a penalty of up to
life imprisonment, 15 9 Illinois provides for imprisonment of not less
than four years nor more than life when the quantity of narcotics
involved exceeds thirty grams, 160 and Indiana permits a sentence
of ten years to life for possessiorf. of more than ten grams of
narcotics with intent to sell.16 1 Upoli conviction for possession of
any quantity of narcotics with intent to sell Rhode Island allows the
court to fix a sentence of up to life imprisonment 16 2 while Texas
provides for a sentence ranging from five years to life. 163 Connecticut requires the court to sentence a non-drug dependent person
to life with a minimum term of from five to twenty years upon
conviction for possession or sale of a quantity of heroin in excess of
one ounce. 164 Both Louisiana 165 and New York 166 mandate the life
sentence upon conviction for possession of any quantity of narcotics with intent to sell.
... ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1002.01(A) (1974);

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 11351 (a) (West Supp. 1975); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-10(3) (Cum. Supp. 1969); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 152.15(1)(1) (Supp. 1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(a)(1) (Supp. 1974);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26(I)(a)(1) (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §24:21-19(b)(1)
(Supp. 1974-75); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(f)(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974-75); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-1510.49(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1432(a)(1) (Supp. 1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(i) (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4-401(a)(1)(i) (Supp.
1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.41(1)(a) (1974).
556ALASKA STAT. § 17.10.200(a) (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-480(a) (Supp.
1975); IOwA CODE ANN. § 204.401(1)(a) (Supp. 1974-75); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4127(a)
(Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 32 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-4125(2)
(Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90:95(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.123(1)(a) (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 39-17-90 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, ch. 84, §§ 4224(e), (f) (Supp. 1974).
157 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-480a (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4127a
(Supp. 1974); MASS. ANN. LAw9 ch. 94C, § 32 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 65-4127(a)
23(1)(a) (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 39-17-90 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, ch. 84, §§ 4 2 24(e), (f) (Supp. 1974).
1973).
15I1LL. STAT. ANN. 56 1/2, § 1401(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1974).
160 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 1401(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
161 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(a)(1)(i) (Burns Supp. 1974).
159

162 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28-4.01A(1) (Supp. 1974).
63 TEXAS REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 4.03(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974-75).
164 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-480a(a) (Supp. 1975).
165 LA. REv. STAT. tit. 40, § 966(B)(1) (West Supp. 1975).
166 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16-1 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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In the majority of states penalties for the sale of narcotic drugs
are somewhat higher than those for either possession or possession
with intent to sell. Every jurisdiction treats the sale of narcotics as a
felony by New York standards. Twelve states provide for a
maximum term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years, 167 twelve
permit up to fifteen years, 168 and eight states authorize a maximum
69
of twenty years' imprisonment for the sale of narcotics.
Arizona,' 70 Idaho,' 7 ' Illinois, 172 Indiana, 73 Missouri, 74 Montana, 7 5 Rhode Island, 7 6 and Texas17 7 permit the sentencing judge
to establish a maximum sentence of any duration up to life, but do
not compel it. California mandates an indeterminate term of five
years to life,17 8 Connecticut establishes an indeterminate term of
five years to life for sale of more than one ounce of heroin by
a nondrug-dependent person,1 7 9 Louisiana imposes a life sentence
with no minimum term,1 8 0 and New York mandates an indeterminate term of life and a minimum ranging from one to twenty-five
167ALASKA REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.10.200(a) (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2104(a) (Supp.
1973); HAWAII REv. STAT. tit. 19, § 329-41(b) (Supp. 1974); IowA CODE ANN. § 204.40 1(I)(a)
(Supp. 1974-75); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.990(I) (Baldwin 1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
94C, § 32 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4125(2) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-95(b)(I) (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(I)(a) (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 475.990(2) (Supp. 1974); S.D. CODE § 39-17-90 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, ch.
84, § 4224(g) (Supp. 1974).
168 Am. CODE tit. 22, § 258(47)(a) (Supp. 1973); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-10(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.15(1)(1) (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-29-139(a)(1) (Supp. 1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 24:21-19(b)(1) (Supp. 1974-75); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(f)(1) (Spec.
Pamphlet 1974-75); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510.49(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 52-1432(a)(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(i) (1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-4401(a)(1)(i) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.41(I)(a) (1974).
169CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-480a(b) (Supp. 1975) (less than one ounce of heroin);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4127a (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2362(c) (Supp.
1974-75); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.1070(41)(1)(a) (Supp. 1974); NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 40, § 453.321(2)(a)(1) (1973); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401(B)(1) (1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-347.31(a)(i) (Supp. 1973).
170 ARM. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1002.02(A) (1974).
171 IDAHO CODE § 37.2732(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1974).
172 ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 56 1/2, § 1401(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974). Under this

provision a life sentence is available only when a quantity of narcotics in excess of 30 grams
is involved.
173 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3561(a)(1)(i) (Supp. 1974). This provision applies only if the
offense involves more than ten grams of narcotics.

tit. 12, § 195.200(4) (Vernon 1969).
175 MONT. REv. CODES § 54-132(b) (Supp. 1974).
176 R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 21-28-4.O1A(1) (Supp. 1974).
177 TEXAS REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4476-15, § 4.03(b)(1) (Supp. 1974-75).
178 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(a) (West Supp. 1975).
179 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-480a(a) (Supp. 1975).
180 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 966(B)(1) (West Supp. 1975).
174 Mo. STAT. ANN.
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years depending upon the quantity 8of the drug involved and the
discretion of the sentencing judge.1 '
These comparative data readily illustrate the relative harshness
of the New York sentencing statutes with respect to narcotics.
Further comparative data compiled by the National Commission
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse1 2 indicate that the New York
treatment of possession and sale of hallucinogens and stimulants
departs even more substantially from that accorded similar offenses in other jurisdictions.
Because drug penalties are in a constant state of flux, it is
difficult to draw any conclusions of permanent significance from a
comparison of the New York penalties with those of other jurisdictions. The findings of the National Commission indicate that there
presently is no clear overall national trend with respect to drug
sanctions. While the Commission discerned a strong national trend
toward the reduction of possession penalties to misdemeanors and
the institution of conditional discharge procedures,1 8 3 it also concluded that "the trend in the sale area has been as much toward
increased penalties as reduced ones."1 8 4 In the years since the
Commission's research was concluded there has been a slight
increase in the number of states which permit the sentencing judge
to impose, in his discretion, a sentence of up to life imprisonment
for certain drug offenses, usually involving substantial quantities of
prohibited substances.18 5 The significant factor which distinguishes
these laws from those of New York is that the sentencing authority
is permitted to individualize the sentence and is not compelled
mindlessly to impose the life sentence. Although few would be
likely to dispute the assertion that the life sentence is sometimes
appropriate in the case of a serious drug offense, it is quite another
matter to say, as New York has done, that it is always appropriate.
Thus, although it cannot be said that the New York revision is
totally antithetical to the current climate of legislative thought, it is
clear that the punishments provided under the new drug law are
far harsher than those of the vast majority of American jurisdictions. The comparative severity of the New York penalties does not
in itself require a finding that the statutory scheme is violative of
1 1 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.43, .41-1, .39-1 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
182 SECOND REPORT, supra note 13, at 269-92.
183 Id.
184 Id.

at 244.
at 245.

185Compare notes 159-64 and accompanying textsupra with note 166 and accompanying
text supra; compare notes 170-77 and accompanying text supra with note 181 and accompanying text supra.
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the eighth amendment, but when the weight of this comparison is
added to that of the factors previously discussed, the argument for
unconstitutionality becomes persuasive.
CONCLUSION

In this Note, the New York drug law has been analyzed within
the framework of those factors which courts consider most important in determining the constitutionality of penal statutes subjected
to attack under the eighth amendment. Based upon the case law
and commentary discussed herein, it is clear that a sound and
convincing case can be made for finding the penalties prescribed
under the new law unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual"
punishment.
The law is cruel in that it permits no consideration of the
qualities of the offender, the nature of his offense, or the circumstances giving rise to his conduct. It is retrogressive in its
emphasis on deterrence at a time when the scant authority available suggests that the deterrent value of severe sentences is highly
suspect when directed at illicit drug activity. It is unusual when
contrasted with the treatment accorded individuals committing
similar crimes in other jurisdictions and more serious crimes within
the same jurisdiction. Finally, and most importantly, it is senseless.
An understanding of the nature and causes of drug abuse, a topic
beyond the scope of this Note, leads inexorably to the conclusion
that the criminal law cannot supply a solution to the problem of
drug abuse. In the long run the answer lies in the development of
a multifaceted program of education and rehabilitation with an
civil
interim utilization of dependence-maintenance programs,
8 6
sanctions.1
criminal
minor
and
commitment procedures,
Robert E. Glanville
186

See, e.g., Abrams, Accountability in Drug Education, 2 CONTEMP. DRUG 353 (1973);

Irwin, A Rational Approach to Drug Abuse Prevention, 2 CoNTEMP. DRUG 3 (1973); Israel & ,
Denardis, supra note 50.

